For years, whenever I have argued that Nigeria inherited a dangerously lopsided political structure from successive military governments, some people have treated the statement as mere political rhetoric.
It is not.
Look at the history of Gongola State.
Gongola provides an extraordinary window into how military decrees could redraw Nigeria's political map and how those decisions continue to influence the distribution of political power and public resources decades after the soldiers returned to the barracks.
General Ibrahim Babangida's military government divided the old Gongola State on 27 August 1991, creating Adamawa State and Taraba State. Adamawa State's own official history confirms its creation from the former Gongola State on that date.
But we must get the historical figures right because the argument is powerful enough without exaggeration.
The Nigeria Year Book records that Gongola had 17 local government authorities after the military government reversed an earlier expansion to 40 councils. Those 17 included Bali, Fufore, Ganye, Gombi, Guyuk, Jalingo, Karim-Lamido, Mayo-Belwa, Michika, Mubi, Numan, Sardauna, Song, Takum, Wukari, Yola and Zing.
Now look at what followed.
Today, the territory of the old Gongola State has become two states with a combined 37 LGAs: Adamawa alone now has 21 LGAs, while Taraba has 16. Adamawa also has three senatorial districts and eight federal constituencies.
Taraba's own administrative history illustrates the continuing multiplication: historical research records that Taraba started with 12 LGAs in 1991 and subsequently increased to 16.
That is precisely why the Nigerian debate about state and local-government creation cannot be dismissed as ancient history.
THE SOLDIERS DID NOT MERELY DRAW MAPS
When military rulers created states and local governments by decree, they were not simply drawing boundaries on pieces of paper.
They were creating permanent units of political and fiscal power.
A state means representation in the Senate.
A local government is a constitutionally recognised unit in Nigeria's revenue-distribution structure.
The Constitution provides for 768 LGAs plus six FCT area councils, producing the familiar total of 774.
More importantly, Section 162 provides that money standing to the credit of the Federation Account is distributed among the federal government, states and local government councils according to the prescribed system.
Therefore, when you create an LGA, you have created far more than a chairman, councillors and a secretariat.
You have created a constitutionally recognised political and fiscal unit.
And when you create a state, you have created a political entity entitled to the constitutional privileges attached to statehood.
That is where my argument begins.
THE QUESTION NIGERIA MUST ANSWER
Who determined how many states different parts of Nigeria received?
Who determined how many LGAs they received?
Were identical population and demographic standards consistently applied throughout the federation?
If they were, let the records demonstrate it.
If they were not, Nigeria must have the courage to confront the consequences.
We cannot continue pretending that the political map handed to civilian democracy in 1999 descended from heaven.
Much of that map was fashioned under military governments.
And civilian Nigeria subsequently constitutionalised much of what the military created.
That is the problem.
The soldiers may have left government, but the political arithmetic they bequeathed to Nigeria remains with us.
GONGOLA IS THE EXHIBIT
This is why I use Gongola as an exhibit.
A historical record tells us that the old Gongola had 17 local government authorities. Today, the same broad territory is represented by Adamawa and Taraba, with 37 LGAs between them.
Think about that transformation.
Now place that experience beside the South-East, which has only five states and 95 LGAs.
The comparison is not an argument that the South-East should be treated as identical to Gongola in history, geography or population. It is an argument that Nigeria should examine whether comparable and transparent criteria were applied when political and fiscal units were created across the federation.
The South-East's five-state structure affects more than administrative identity. It influences senatorial representation, federal constituencies, access to state-level institutions, bargaining power in national politics and the distribution of public resources. The number and distribution of LGAs also matter because local-government structures are tied to representation, administration and the wider revenue-allocation framework.
Now multiply that inquiry across Nigeria.
Take every state.
Take every LGA.
Take every military state-creation exercise.
Take every local-government-creation exercise.
Put population beside them.
Put landmass beside them.
Put federal allocations beside them.
Put representation beside them.
Then ask whether Nigerians genuinely entered the Fourth Republic in 1999 on an equitable political foundation.
That is the investigation Nigeria needs.
I am not arguing that the people of Adamawa or Taraba should lose their states or local governments. They are Nigerians entitled to development and representation like everybody else.
Nor am I arguing that the South-East should receive special treatment without evidence or constitutional process.
My argument is about structural justice.
If one section of a federation enters democracy with substantially more political units than another without an objectively defensible basis, merely holding elections every four years does not cure the underlying imbalance.
Democracy is not simply voting.
Democracy also requires fairness in the architecture within which those votes operate.
YOU CANNOT BUILD JUSTICE ON UNEQUAL FOUNDATIONS
This is particularly important when discussing the grievances of Ndigbo and the South-East.
Instead of simply telling aggrieved Nigerians to “wait for elections,” Nigeria should answer the deeper constitutional question:
Is the federation itself fairly structured?
That question cannot be answered with slogans about national unity.
It must be answered with numbers.
How many states?
How many LGAs?
What population?
What representation?
What allocation?
What historical criteria produced them?
Let Nigeria put those figures on one table.
Let us specifically compare the South-East's five-state, 95-LGA structure with the administrative expansion that followed the division of Gongola, while also examining population, landmass, revenue allocation, federal constituencies and senatorial representation.
If the structure is equitable, the evidence will establish it.
But if the evidence demonstrates systematic imbalance, then restructuring is not a favour being demanded by anybody.
It becomes a democratic necessity.
Nigeria cannot indefinitely preserve military-era arrangements as sacred democratic institutions while simultaneously demanding that every Nigerian accept the resulting political arithmetic as fair.
The uniform has disappeared.
The decrees have been replaced by constitutional provisions.
But many of the boundaries, states, LGAs and political consequences remain.
That is why, whenever I speak about the lopsided structure of Nigeria, I say:
GO BACK TO THE MAP.
Go back to Gongola.
Go back to the South-East's five-state structure.
Go back to the military decrees.
Follow the multiplication of states and LGAs.
Then follow the representation and the money.
Nigeria's problem is not merely about who wins the next presidential election.
It is about the political architecture within which that election takes place.
Until Nigeria is prepared to interrogate that architecture and correct demonstrable inequalities, the argument over marginalisation, restructuring and self-determination will not disappear.
It will only grow louder.