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# THE PRESIDENT'S UMPIRE; on Why Nigeria must end presidential control of electoral appointments
- URL: https://uhlblog.com/the-presidents-umpire-on-why-nigeria-must-end-presidential-control-of-electoral-appointments/
- Published: 2026-11-09T15:50:05.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-09T15:50:05.000Z
- Author: Dr. The Rt. Hon. Okechukwu Umeano

Worked for 22s

SPECIAL NATIONAL INVESTIGATION | NIGERIA

### 

A President seeking re-election should not have decisive influence over the appointment of the referee who will supervise that election.

An examination of Nigeria's electoral appointment system, international democratic practices and the urgent need for constitutional reform.

# THE PRESIDENT'S UMPIRE

## Why Nigeria Must End Presidential Control of Electoral Appointments

**By the Investigative Editorial Desk**

### THE DEMOCRATIC CONTRADICTION

Nigeria's democracy faces a fundamental constitutional question that deserves national attention: Why should the President of the Federal Republic have the power to initiate the appointment of the chairman and members of the institution responsible for conducting elections in which the President's own political party may be a contestant?

This is not an argument against the personality of any sitting President. It is an argument about the structure of democratic power.

The problem is institutional, not personal.

A President is a political actor. The President belongs to a political party, has political allies, has an electoral constituency and, in many circumstances, has an interest in the political outcome of the next general election.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), however, is expected to stand above all political interests.

It must serve the ruling party, opposition parties, independent candidates and millions of Nigerian voters without discrimination.

This raises a question that Nigeria cannot continue to avoid:

**Can an electoral umpire enjoy sufficient public confidence when the President, who is a political beneficiary of the electoral process, initiates the appointment of the umpire?**

### WHAT THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION SAYS

Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, as amended, establishes INEC under Section 153.

Section 154 provides that the President appoints the chairman and members of INEC, subject to Senate confirmation. It also requires the President to consult the Council of State.

Section 157 provides constitutional protection against arbitrary removal, requiring a presidential action supported by a two-thirds majority of the Senate on specified grounds.

Section 158 further protects the independence of INEC by providing that the commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in exercising its functions.

These provisions matter. It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that the Nigerian President can simply appoint or dismiss an INEC chairman at will.

But the constitutional question remains: Is the existing appointment arrangement sufficient to guarantee public confidence in an institution whose decisions determine who governs Nigeria?

The fact that the Senate confirms an appointment does not automatically eliminate executive influence, particularly where the President's political party controls the legislative majority.

Consultation is also not the same as an independent, competitive selection process.

### NIGERIA IS NOT ALONE, BUT THE WORLD OFFERS DIFFERENT MODELS

Nigeria is not the only country where the President formally appoints electoral commissioners. The important difference is the institutional checks surrounding the appointment.

**GHANA: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT WITH COUNCIL OF STATE ADVICE**

Ghana provides an interesting comparison because its system resembles Nigeria's in some respects.

Under Article 70(2) of the Ghanaian Constitution, the President appoints the chairman, deputy chairmen and other members of the Electoral Commission on the advice of the Council of State.

This demonstrates that presidential appointment is not peculiar to Nigeria. However, the advice requirement is an important constitutional feature.

**SOUTH AFRICA: PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION**

South Africa provides a different model.

Under Section 193 of its Constitution, the President appoints members of the Electoral Commission on the recommendation of the National Assembly.

The candidates emerge through a committee proportionally composed of political parties represented in Parliament. The Assembly must approve the recommendation by a majority vote. Civil society participation may also be provided for.

This arrangement places a substantial part of the selection process outside the President's personal discretion.

**KENYA: SELECTION, PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL AND PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT**

Kenya's Constitution provides that commissioners must be identified and recommended through a process prescribed by national legislation, approved by the National Assembly and formally appointed by the President.

The President therefore performs the formal appointment function after the prescribed selection and parliamentary approval processes.

**INDIA: A THREE-MEMBER SELECTION COMMITTEE**

India's 2023 legislation provides for a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.

The President makes the formal appointment on the committee's recommendation.

However, the arrangement also exposes a weakness: two of the three committee members come from the governing side. The presence of an opposition representative does not necessarily guarantee an independent selection outcome.

### THE LESSON FROM THESE COUNTRIES

The international experience does not establish one universally accepted appointment formula.

It demonstrates something more important: countries can distribute the power to identify, scrutinise, recommend and formally appoint electoral commissioners in different ways.

The real democratic test is whether the system provides credible independence, professional competence, transparency and protection from political interference.

Nigeria should learn from these different arrangements rather than assume that presidential appointment is the only available constitutional option.

### THE PRESIDENT IS NOT THE ONLY STAKEHOLDER IN AN ELECTION

An election belongs to the citizens.

It does not belong to the President, the ruling party, the opposition or the political establishment.

The authority of an electoral commission comes from the confidence of the electorate that its decisions are impartial.

When citizens begin to suspect that the appointment of an electoral chief is politically influenced, the commission may face a credibility problem even before it conducts an election.

That is why independence must not merely exist in the language of the Constitution. It must be visible in the process by which electoral commissioners are selected, appointed, funded and protected.

### WHAT NIGERIA SHOULD DO

Nigeria should consider a constitutional amendment that establishes an independent, transparent and competitive appointment process for INEC leadership.

The following reforms deserve serious consideration:

**1\. Establish an independent selection panel.**

The panel should include representatives of the judiciary, professional associations, civil society and other credible institutions, with appropriate safeguards against political domination.

**2\. Introduce open recruitment.**

The position of INEC chairman should be publicly advertised. Candidates should submit their qualifications, professional records and relevant declarations.

**3\. Require public hearings.**

Shortlisted candidates should undergo public scrutiny. Nigerians should be able to examine their professional experience, political affiliations, conflicts of interest and commitment to electoral independence.

**4\. Guarantee meaningful multiparty participation.**

The ruling party and opposition parties should participate in the selection process. Neither side should be able to monopolise it.

**5\. Require a broad legislative consensus.**

The Senate should confirm the final nominee through a process designed to encourage support beyond the governing party's political bloc.

**6\. Protect tenure and financial independence.**

Commissioners must be protected against arbitrary removal, political intimidation and financial manipulation. Their operational budgets should be protected by law.

**7\. Publish the selection criteria and final reasons for appointment.**

Transparency should not end when a name is announced. Nigerians should know how the successful candidate emerged.

### THE BIGGER QUESTION: WHO WATCHES THE REFEREE?

Nigeria has spent decades debating election rigging, disputed results, judicial reversals, party defections and the legitimacy of elected governments.

But how much national attention has been devoted to the institutional process that produces the leadership of the body responsible for managing those elections?

The independence of an electoral commission cannot be measured only by whether its chairman declares himself independent.

It must also be measured by the constitutional arrangements that protect him from pressure.

A credible electoral system should make it difficult for any President, ruling party or opposition party to manipulate the appointment process.

The same principle must apply regardless of which political party occupies Aso Rock.

This reform must not be designed to benefit one political party or disadvantage another. It must protect every Nigerian, including future Presidents who will need an electoral commission whose integrity is accepted by the country.

### OUR POSITION: REFORM THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS, NOT JUST THE ELECTORAL LAW

Nigeria does not necessarily need another round of political promises about credible elections.

It needs stronger institutions.

Amending electoral procedures without addressing the institutional safeguards surrounding the appointment of electoral leadership leaves an important constitutional question unresolved.

The National Assembly, the Council of State, civil society organisations, the Nigerian Bar Association, professional bodies and the Nigerian electorate should open a serious debate on this issue.

The objective should be to remove excessive executive discretion from the selection process while preserving the constitutional role of the President as a formal appointing authority where appropriate.

The electoral umpire must be accountable to the Constitution and the Nigerian people, not beholden to the political authority that appointed him.

**A President should contest elections. Political parties should campaign. Citizens should vote. And an independent electoral commission should count and declare the votes without fear or favour.**

That is the democratic standard Nigeria should aspire to.

**THE REFEREE MUST NOT BE THE POLITICAL PROPERTY OF ANY PLAYER.**

### Sources and constitutional documents

The investigation is grounded in the following primary legal and institutional materials:

- Nigeria — [1999 Constitution, Sections 154, 157 and 158](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria%5F2023?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com).
- Ghana — [1992 Constitution, Article 70](https://osp.gov.gh/media/Resources/Ghana%5FConstitution.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com).
- South Africa — [Constitution, Section 193](https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-9-state-institutions?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com).
- Kenya — [Constitution, Article 250](https://www.mod.go.ke/the-constitution-of-kenya-2010-online/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com).
- India — [Election Commissioners Appointment Act, 2023](https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2023/248020.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com).
- International IDEA — [Independence in Electoral Management](https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/independence-electoral-management?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). Constitute +5

### Recommended next investigation

I suggest tracking the National Assembly's constitutional and electoral reform proposals to establish whether meaningful changes to INEC appointments are being considered.