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NIGERIA ONCE MADE WHAT IT USED — WHO DISMANTLED THE FACTORIES

FROM PEUGEOT, VOLKSWAGEN, ANAMMCO, LEYLAND, MICHELIN, DUNLOP AND TEXTILE MILLS TO ₦18 TRILLION OF MANUFACTURED IMPORTS IN SIX MONTHS: THE REAL STORY BEHIND THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAIRA

Nigeria did not simply wake up one morning with a weak currency. Over four decades, the country allowed factories, refineries, industrial supply chains and productive capacity to deteriorate while increasingly importing what Nigerians once made at home. The question demanding investigation is no longer merely, “Why is the naira weak?” It is: What happened to the Nigerian production machine?

By Dr. (The Rt. Hon.) Okey Umeano
Former Member, House of Representatives, Third Republic

There was a Nigeria many young Nigerians have never seen.

A Nigeria where the question was not merely, “Where will we find dollars to import it?”

Nigeria actually made things.

Cars rolled out of Kaduna. Volkswagen vehicles came out of Lagos. Trucks and buses were assembled in Enugu and Ibadan. Tyres came out of Port Harcourt and Lagos. Textile factories employed thousands. Refineries converted Nigerian crude into products for Nigerian consumers.

This is not nostalgia.

It is industrial history.

Official records of Nigeria's automotive industry confirm that the Federal Government entered agreements during the 1970s and 1980s establishing Peugeot Automobile Nigeria in Kaduna and Volkswagen of Nigeria in Lagos, alongside four major commercial-vehicle plants: ANAMMCO in Enugu, Steyr in Bauchi, National Truck Manufacturers in Kano and Leyland Nigeria in Ibadan.

They existed. They produced. They employed Nigerians.

And around them was supposed to grow something even more important: a network of Nigerian component manufacturers supplying parts, materials, services, engineering skills and jobs.

Then something went terribly wrong.


THE NUMBER THAT SHOULD SHOCK NIGERIA: ₦18 TRILLION

Fast-forward to 2026.

An analysis of National Bureau of Statistics foreign-trade data shows that Nigeria imported approximately ₦18 trillion worth of manufactured goods in the first six months of 2026 alone.

That was up from about ₦15.4 trillion during the corresponding period of 2025.

Think about that.

₦18,000,000,000,000.

In six months.

Every imported machine, vehicle, industrial input or finished product ultimately creates demand for foreign exchange somewhere in the chain.

Meanwhile, Nigerian factories need foreign exchange for machinery, spare parts and imported inputs.

Then Nigerians ask:

WHY IS THE NAIRA UNDER PRESSURE?

We should also ask:

WHAT ARE WE PRODUCING TO EARN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE WE ARE SPENDING?


THE NAIRA TELLS PART OF THE STORY

One popular version of this story says that in 1980 one dollar exchanged for ₦8.

That is incorrect.

The historical situation was actually more dramatic.

Contemporary historical exchange-rate series put the dollar at roughly 55 kobo in 1980. In other words, nominally, ₦1 bought substantially more than US$1 under the exchange-rate regime then in place.

We must, however, be careful.

That does not mean industrial production alone determined the naira's value. Nigeria operated different exchange-rate regimes; oil revenues, reserves, inflation, fiscal policy, monetary policy and later market liberalisation all mattered.

Indeed, the CBN itself has documented how Nigeria's earlier fixed exchange-rate regime contributed to overvaluation and economic distortions before the move toward a flexible system under the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986.

But compare that history with today.

The CBN's published NFEM data showed the naira around ₦1,330 to US$1 in late September 2026.

The bigger question therefore goes beyond exchange rates:

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ECONOMY BEHIND THE CURRENCY?


FOLLOW THE FACTORIES

This investigation should begin in Kaduna.

Peugeot.

Then Lagos.

Volkswagen.

Then Enugu.

ANAMMCO.

Ibadan.

Leyland.

Bauchi.

Steyr.

Kano.

National Truck Manufacturers.

Nigeria's own automotive authority records these plants as part of a deliberate national industrial strategy.

The vision was not supposed to end with screwing imported pieces together.

Industrialisation works through chains.

A vehicle factory buys tyres.

The tyre company buys rubber and chemicals.

The vehicle manufacturer needs batteries, seats, glass, cables, brake components, paint and steel.

Those suppliers employ people.

Those employees buy food, rent houses and pay taxes.

Engineers acquire expertise.

Technical schools train workers.

Transport companies move goods.

Banks finance businesses.

Another Nigerian company supplies the first company.

That is how an industrial economy multiplies wealth.

Destroy the anchor factory and you don't merely lose one factory.

You begin destroying the ecosystem around it.


THEN THE TYRE FACTORIES WENT

For decades Michelin manufactured tyres in Port Harcourt while Dunlop manufactured in Lagos.

At their peak, the two reportedly controlled about 75 per cent of Nigeria's tyre market and produced approximately 2.25 million tyres annually.

Michelin stopped Nigerian production in 2007.

Dunlop followed in 2008.
In 1979 I did my long vacation job at the Ikeja Dunlop factory Lagos

Today the companies operate in a market substantially supplied by imports.

Why?

Industry accounts repeatedly identify familiar problems:

unreliable electricity,

high production costs,

infrastructure deficiencies,

import competition,

and inconsistent trade and industrial policies.

Notice something.

These are not acts of God.

They are economic-policy problems.


WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TEXTILE GIANT?

Kaduna and Kano were once synonymous with textile manufacturing.

Factories employed armies of workers.

Cotton farmers fed factories.

Factories produced cloth.

Transporters moved cotton and finished textiles.

Traders distributed the products.

Today that industrial chain has been badly diminished.

The latest available data makes painful reading.

Nigeria's textile, apparel and footwear subsector contracted for the ninth consecutive quarter in Q2 2026.

Its contribution to real GDP declined to 1.77 per cent, from 1.87 per cent a year earlier.

Nigeria meanwhile imported about ₦1.06 trillion of textiles and textile-related products in 2025, according to analysis of official trade data.

We once grew cotton to feed Nigerian factories.

Now foreign factories increasingly feed Nigerian shops.

That difference matters enormously.

Because every time production migrates abroad, a portion of the jobs, industrial knowledge, tax base and foreign-exchange earnings migrates with it.


AND THEN THERE IS THE GREAT PETROLEUM PARADOX

Few examples expose Nigeria's industrial contradictions more clearly than petroleum.

Nigeria's first Port Harcourt refinery was commissioned in 1965.

Warri followed in 1978.

Kaduna came in 1980.

Historical research records that after Warri came on stream, the existing refineries could meet domestic petroleum-product requirements at the time. Kaduna was subsequently built as demand expanded.

The ambition became even greater.

Nigeria planned additional refining capacity partly with petroleum-product exports in mind.

The new Port Harcourt refinery eventually came on stream in 1989; after domestic requirements were met, surplus products could be exported.

But subsequent decades brought chronic refinery underperformance and dependence on imported petroleum products.

That story is particularly important now because Nigeria's refining landscape is changing again, including substantial private refining capacity.

Yet even in Q1 2026 another problem appeared: NUPRC says 61.9 million barrels were allocated to domestic refineries, producers offered 68.7 million barrels, but only 28.5 million barrels were actually supplied.

So even after building new refining capacity, Nigeria is confronting another fundamental industrial question:

Can Nigerian crude reliably reach Nigerian refineries on commercially workable terms?


THE DEINDUSTRIALISATION BILL HAS ARRIVED

This is where the investigation becomes bigger than abandoned factories.

The bill eventually arrives in the currency market.

It arrives as unemployment.

It arrives as dependence on imports.

It arrives as reduced technological capacity.

It arrives as vulnerability whenever oil prices fall.

It arrives whenever manufacturers queue for foreign exchange.

Manufacturing reportedly accounted for nearly 30 per cent of Nigerian economic output in 1981, compared with roughly 8 per cent in recent years, although historical GDP methodologies and subsequent rebasing mean the figures should not be treated as perfectly like-for-like.

The Nigerian Economic Summit Group recently highlighted the same structural problem: high energy costs, inadequate finance, import competition and weak industrial coordination continue to constrain manufacturing, while Nigeria exports raw materials and imports finished products.

There, in one sentence, is much of Nigeria's economic dilemma.

WE EXPORT VALUE CHEAPLY AND BUY VALUE BACK EXPENSIVELY.

Export crude.

Import sophisticated petroleum products.

Export agricultural commodities.

Import processed foods.

Export raw materials.

Import finished goods.

Then borrow dollars and struggle to defend the naira.

That economic model cannot indefinitely substitute for industrialisation.


WHO KILLED THE FACTORIES?

That question cannot honestly be answered by blaming one president, one political party or one administration.

Nigeria's industrial retreat occurred over decades and under successive military and civilian governments.

The investigation therefore has to examine the policies themselves:

What happened to electricity?

What happened to industrial credit?

What happened to railway freight?

What happened to protection against smuggling?

What happened to local-content requirements?

What happened to the cotton-textile chain?

What happened to petrochemicals?

What happened to steel?

What happened to technical education?

Why could imported finished goods sometimes land in Nigerian markets more cheaply than Nigerian factories could produce them?

Why did companies conclude that importing was easier than manufacturing?

And perhaps most importantly:

WHO BENEFITED FROM TURNING A PRODUCING ECONOMY INTO AN IMPORT MARKET?

That is where journalists, Parliament, economists and citizens should follow the money.


PRODUCTION MUST BECOME A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Nigeria cannot simply decree its way back to 1980.

Nor should we romanticise that period. The old economy had inefficiencies, protected industries, an overvalued currency and enormous dependence on petroleum revenues.

The answer is not to recreate 1980.

The answer is to build the competitive industrial Nigeria of 2030, 2040 and 2050.

That requires reliable electricity.

Competitive ports.

Functional freight railways.

Stable industrial policy.

Long-term manufacturing finance.

Local refining.

Petrochemicals.

Steel.

Automotive components.

Agro-processing.

Pharmaceuticals.

Textiles.

Technology.

And policies that reward businesses for making things in Nigeria, not merely obtaining foreign exchange to import them.

The NBS still reports positive manufacturing growth—3.29 per cent year-on-year in Q1 2026—so the story is not that Nigerian manufacturing has disappeared.

The challenge is scale, competitiveness and industrial depth.

Nigeria has more than 200 million potential consumers.

That enormous market can finance factories in Guangzhou, Mumbai, Istanbul and elsewhere—or help sustain factories in Aba, Nnewi, Onitsha, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt.

That is a choice shaped substantially by infrastructure and public policy.


BRING BACK THE PRODUCING NIGERIA

The greatest tragedy is not that the naira has fallen from the exchange rates Nigerians remember decades ago.

The greater tragedy is that too much of the productive machinery that once stood behind Nigeria's industrial ambitions was allowed to deteriorate.

A currency is ultimately only one indicator.

Factories matter.

Exports matter.

Productivity matters.

Technology matters.

Skills matter.

Electricity matters.

Value addition matters.

A country cannot sustainably consume what the rest of the world produces while expecting its currency perpetually to behave like that of a major exporting economy.

Nigeria has the population.

Nigeria has oil.

Nigeria has gas.

Nigeria has agricultural land.

Nigeria has minerals.

Nigeria has entrepreneurs.

Nigeria has engineers.

Nigeria has a huge domestic market.

What Nigeria requires is a durable system that turns those advantages into competitive products.

MAKE THE TYRES HERE.

REFINE THE CRUDE HERE.

PROCESS THE COTTON HERE.

BUILD THE VEHICLE COMPONENTS HERE.

PROCESS THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE HERE.

CREATE THE INDUSTRIAL JOBS HERE.

Then export what the world wants to buy.

The national debate should therefore move beyond:

“HOW DO WE SAVE THE NAIRA?”

The more fundamental question is:

WHAT DOES NIGERIA PRODUCE THAT THE WORLD WILL PAY US FOR?

Answer that question at scale, and Nigeria will have begun addressing one of the deepest structural problems behind its currency, employment and industrial crises.

The road back to economic strength does not begin at the Bureau de Change.

IT BEGINS AT THE FACTORY GATE.

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