FOLLOW THE CRUDE. FOLLOW THE MONEY.
A forensic investigation should separate barrels pledged from cash actually received, and then trace the cash into Federation accounts and expenditure. The records already reveal several major commitments, but they do not yet provide one citizen-readable, transaction-by-transaction ledger connecting every lifted cargo to every naira ultimately spent.
The crude-commitment ledger
Facility Crude commitment What public records show
Project Gazelle 90,000 bpd NNPC says it entered the forward-sale agreement in Dec. 2023. By Dec. 2024 it had drawn ₦4.9tn, crude worth ₦991bn had been lifted, and ₦3.8tn remained.
Project Yield 67,000 bpd equivalent Secured by forward sale of refined-product equivalent; ₦1.4tn had been drawn by Dec. 2024.
Project Leopard 35,000 bpd Five-year crude-backed arrangement; reported outstanding balance ₦1.3tn at Dec. 2024.
Eagle Export Funding 21,000 bpd Part of the four major arrangements reported from NNPC accounts. EITI has separately documented Project Eagle's resource-backed structure and disclosure gaps.
TOTAL of these four 213,000 bpd Equivalent to 77.745 million barrels a year if maintained continuously.
That 213,000 bpd figure should not be interpreted as 213,000 barrels physically handed to banks every day in identical transactions. The facilities have different repayment structures. It is nevertheless an important measure of the petroleum volumes/equivalents associated with these financing obligations.
Follow Gazelle's money
Gazelle gives us the clearest trail.
Afreximbank announced an initial $2.25 billion disbursement in January 2024. It subsequently announced another $925 million, bringing funded proceeds to $3.175 billion.
NNPC's audited account provides the crucial next link: the Gazelle funding was used to finance an advance payment of future taxes and royalties owed to the Federation from PSC assets.
So our forensic trail becomes:
Nigerian crude → 90,000 bpd forward commitment → Gazelle SPV/Afreximbank financing → $3.175bn funded → NNPC → advance payment of future Federation taxes/royalties → government finances → ?
That final question mark is where the next investigation must concentrate.
We need to trace those proceeds through the Federation's accounting system into specific accounts, budgetary releases, MDAs, projects and final Treasury payments.
Afreximbank said the proceeds would support macroeconomic stability, imports, industrialisation and trade development, while NNPC said the proceeds had been made available to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Those broad purposes are not a substitute for a transaction-level expenditure ledger.
Gazelle's price deserves scrutiny too
Afreximbank disclosed that the original five-year facility carried a margin of 6% per annum above three-month SOFR and incorporated a mechanism for excess cash from committed barrels.
NNPC's later audited accounts describe the facility as three-month SOFR plus 6.5%, while also referring to margin/liquidity-premium components.
Those descriptions should be reconciled publicly so citizens can see the all-in effective financing cost, including interest, premiums, fees, hedging costs and refinancing charges.
And now Nigeria is moving toward Gazelle 2.
In September 2026, NEC approved a proposed $4.5 billion refinancing, comprising roughly $1.5 billion to refinance the remaining Gazelle obligation plus $3 billion in additional liquidity.
That makes disclosure more—not less—urgent.
Now follow the crude toward Dangote
Here the investigation becomes particularly interesting.
Nigeria is simultaneously trying to satisfy domestic refineries and service/export crude under existing commercial arrangements.
NUPRC says that in Q1 2026, domestic refineries were allocated 61.9 million barrels. Producers offered 68.7 million, but only 28.5 million barrels were actually supplied. The regulator attributed much of the gap to pricing differences between producers and refiners.
The situation improved sharply in Q2.
NUPRC says Dangote required about 63 million barrels during Q2. Producers offered it 68.1 million barrels, but Dangote ultimately accepted 52.6 million barrels. Across all domestic refineries, actual Q2 supply reached 53.7 million barrels.
So the evidence does not support the simple allegation that all of Dangote's shortfall is caused by crude-backed loans. Pricing, contractual terms and refinery acceptance also matter.
But it raises an important accounting question:
When Nigeria calculates crude available for domestic refining, how much production is already constrained by forward-sale financing and other pre-existing commitments?
That number should be published monthly.
THE DOCUMENT NIGERIANS SHOULD DEMAND
Nigeria needs one National Crude Oil Commitment & Revenue Ledger, updated monthly.
For every cargo, it should disclose:
Cargo ID → terminal → crude grade → barrels lifted → lifting date → beneficial entitlement holder → buyer/off-taker → realised price → gross value → whether ordinary sale or debt-linked lifting → facility serviced → amount credited against debt → remaining facility balance → government revenue received.
And for every crude-backed loan:
Original loan → cash actually disbursed → interest → fees → total repayment obligation → barrels/equivalent pledged → barrels actually delivered → value credited → balance outstanding → maturity.
Then comes the money side:
Loan proceeds → NNPC account → Federation payment → Treasury/Federation Account → budget line → MDA → warrant/release → contractor or beneficiary → project → amount actually paid.
That is what “Follow the Crude, Follow the Money” should mean.
EITI's assessment makes the transparency problem particularly important. For Project Eagle, it found that public documents described the basic arrangement but did not disclose some important loan terms; it also noted differing views over whether the transactions were adequately reflected in federal budget documents.
And Nigerian states have now demanded forensic scrutiny of crude-backed borrowing. One recent analysis puts seven crude-for-loan facilities at about $8.86 billion, with approximately $6.97 billion actually received as of December 2023; it also estimated that four major facilities represented about 14.66% of Nigeria's 2025 crude production if their stated daily commitments persisted throughout that year.
That 14.66% is an analytical estimate rather than an official declaration that precisely that proportion of every day's production physically went to creditors. But it demonstrates why a reconciled official ledger matters.
The National Assembly's forensic questions
The Senate and House should summon the relevant institutions with the underlying documents—not merely presentations.
For each facility they should establish: Who authorised it? What was borrowed? What actually arrived? What is the all-in cost? Which crude assets secure it? How many barrels have been lifted? At what prices? Where did the cash go? How much remains outstanding? What approvals were required and obtained? What revenue would the Federation otherwise have received?
And for Gazelle 2 there is one additional question:
Before another $4.5 billion structure is completed, can Nigerians see the reconciled account of Gazelle 1?
This investigation should ultimately reduce the entire petroleum financing system to two columns that every citizen can understand:
BARRELS OUT → MONEY IN → DEBT REDUCED
and
MONEY IN → TREASURY → BUDGET → PROJECT → BENEFIT TO NIGERIANS
Until government can publicly reconcile both chains, the central accountability question remains:
WE CAN FOLLOW THE CRUDE OUT OF NIGERIA. CAN WE FOLLOW EVERY DOLLAR AND NAIRA ALL THE WAY TO WHERE IT WAS SPENT?