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BRAZIL COUNTED ITS VOTES — WHY MUST NIGERIA STILL FIGHT OVER THE COUNT?

215 MILLION PEOPLE, ELECTRONIC VOTING, RAPID RESULTS — AS NIGERIA APPROACHES 2027, THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER WHETHER TECHNOLOGY EXISTS, BUT WHETHER THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL WILL EXISTS TO MAKE EVERY VOTE VERIFIABLE

Former Member, House of Representatives, Third Republic

Brazil went to the polls on Sunday, 4 October 2026.

By shortly after midnight, the essential verdict of a presidential election involving one of the world's largest democracies was already clear.

With 99.99 per cent of voting machines counted by 12:11 a.m. on Monday, Brazil's Superior Electoral Court reported that Senator Flávio Bolsonaro had received 56,104,268 votes — 47.03 per cent of valid votes.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received 53,876,617 votes — 45.16 per cent.

Neither candidate crossed the constitutional threshold of more than 50 per cent of valid votes.

The consequence was straightforward: a second-round election on 25 October 2026.

No endless suspense was required before citizens could know the broad outcome.

No political party needed to wait for days merely to discover what the national numbers were saying.

And, importantly, ordinary Brazilians did not have to depend solely upon politicians telling them what had happened.

Brazil's electoral authority made the evolving total available electronically. Citizens could follow results nationally, by state, municipality and electoral zone as polling-station returns were transmitted and processed.

Even more significant is what Brazil makes available after voting.

At the close of voting, each electronic voting machine produces a Boletim de Urna — polling-station result bulletin. Copies are printed, one is publicly displayed, and party representatives may receive copies. The bulletin contains a QR code that facilitates comparison with the figures subsequently published by the electoral authority.

Brazil's election authority also makes polling-station bulletins, digital vote records and voting-machine logs available for examination and download, allowing outsiders to scrutinise the published result.

Brazil's election was not flawless. There were electoral offences and reported incidents, and its system has its own controversies.

That is precisely why Nigeria should study the architecture, rather than romanticise another country.

The lesson is not that Brazil has discovered perfect democracy.

The lesson is that technology can dramatically reduce the distance between the polling station, the national total and the citizen watching the process.

And that brings us home.

WHAT HAPPENED TO NIGERIA IN 2023?

Before the 2023 general election, Nigerians were introduced to BVAS and the INEC Result Viewing Portal, IReV.

Expectations were enormous.

INEC itself explained that polling-unit result sheets would be scanned using BVAS and uploaded to IReV, a public-facing portal intended to allow citizens and stakeholders to see polling-unit results.

This was potentially revolutionary.

Nigeria had arrived at the doorstep of an electoral system in which millions of citizens could become unofficial auditors.

Every political party could obtain its polling-unit results.

Journalists could download them.

Civil-society organisations could independently tabulate them.

Citizens could compare what was announced at their polling units with what eventually entered the national calculation.

Then came 25 February 2023.

Something went wrong.

And this is not merely an allegation made by opposition politicians.

INEC itself subsequently acknowledged it.

The Commission's post-election review records that as presiding officers began uploading results, INEC started receiving reports that uploads of presidential polling-unit results were failing.

According to INEC's own explanation, Senate and House of Representatives result uploads were not suffering the same problem. The difficulty affected presidential results and was traced to a configuration problem in the system.

INEC later described the incident as a technical glitch caused by complexity within the system and maintained that it did not affect the credibility of the election because polling-unit results had also been announced publicly, displayed and supplied to party agents.

That is INEC's position.

But there is another important part of the historical record.

The European Union Election Observation Mission concluded that failures in prompt transmission and publication substantially diminished the transparency value of IReV.

Its observers reported that only about 20 per cent of presidential polling-unit results were on IReV by noon on 26 February, and that more than a quarter were still unavailable on the portal when the presidential result was declared.

The EU mission consequently recommended a robust and easily verifiable results system, including real-time publication of polling-unit and collation-level results.

Those findings should not be dismissed simply because one agrees or disagrees with the eventual winner.

This issue is bigger than Bola Tinubu.

It is bigger than Peter Obi.

It is bigger than Atiku Abubakar.

It is about the electoral machinery Nigeria will hand to the next generation.

The legal challenges to the 2023 presidential election eventually reached the Supreme Court. On 26 October 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the opposition challenges and upheld President Tinubu's election.

That judgment is part of the constitutional record.

But judicial validation of an election does not prevent a country from examining weaknesses in its electoral machinery and improving them.

Indeed, INEC itself says efficient, transparent and accurate transmission and collation are essential because failures at that stage can damage public confidence in an election.

NIGERIA MUST ASK A HARDER QUESTION

Why should Nigerians in 2027 still depend so heavily upon a long chain of human collation before they can independently establish what happened across the country?

INEC's own description of the Nigerian presidential process illustrates the chain.

Results move from polling units to ward collation, then to local governments, then state collation centres and ultimately to the Chief Electoral Commissioner for national collation and declaration.

Every additional human interface potentially becomes another point requiring safeguards, documentation and public scrutiny.

Technology cannot eliminate dishonesty.

But technology combined with radical transparency can make manipulation substantially easier to detect.

Imagine a Nigerian presidential election in which, immediately after counting at every polling unit:

Form EC8A is completed and signed.

Party agents receive copies.

A copy is publicly displayed.

The result is electronically transmitted.

The original image appears immediately in a permanent public database.

Every subsequent ward, LGA and state collation document is published electronically.

Nothing previously uploaded can silently disappear or be overwritten.

Every correction leaves a visible digital audit trail showing what changed, when it changed and under whose authorisation.

Then imagine INEC providing the entire dataset in a machine-readable format so universities, newspapers, political parties, civil-society organisations and individual programmers can independently add the figures.

At that point the chairman of INEC would still perform the constitutional duty of declaration.

But he would no longer be the only practical gateway through which the Nigerian people discover their national result.

The country would already possess the evidence.

THE 2027 REFORM NIGERIA NEEDS

Nigeria therefore needs something much more fundamental than buying additional election equipment.

We need an open-results architecture.

Every polling-unit result should be publicly available immediately after completion and transmission, subject to clearly defined contingency procedures where connectivity genuinely fails.

Every collation document should also be uploaded.

Every alteration should be permanently logged.

The public database should be downloadable.

The technology should be independently tested before election day.

Its security architecture should be subjected to credible technical scrutiny without exposing systems to attack.

There should be redundant servers, disaster-recovery systems and clearly published procedures for technical failure.

And where electronic and physical records conflict, the law and regulations must establish an unambiguous, auditable procedure for resolving the discrepancy.

These are not revolutionary demands.

They are the natural destination of reforms Nigeria has already begun.

The Electoral Act 2022 recognised technology in accreditation and provided a framework within which INEC developed electronic transmission and result-viewing procedures. INEC itself described electronic transmission as an important innovation in election management.

The question now is whether Nigeria will finish the journey.

AND WHAT ABOUT OUR COLONIAL INHERITANCE?

There is also a historical argument that Nigerians are entitled to investigate seriously.

British colonial rule created the territorial structure that became modern Nigeria and shaped early systems of administration, census-taking and political representation.

But historical grievances should be demonstrated with records rather than converted automatically into explanations for every contemporary electoral failure.

Britain left Nigeria as the colonial governing power at independence in 1960.

Nigeria's political class has therefore had more than six decades to amend laws, redesign institutions, adopt technology and construct electoral safeguards suitable for a sovereign republic.

Colonial history matters.

But today's Nigerian leaders must answer for today's Nigerian institutions.

If the electoral architecture is inadequate in 2027, responsibility cannot simply be transported backward to 1914.

The National Assembly can legislate.

INEC can improve its systems.

Political parties can insist upon transparent rules.

Civil society can audit the process.

The courts can interpret the law.

And Nigerian citizens can demand that all of them do their jobs.

BRAZIL HAS GIVEN NIGERIA A TIMELY CASE STUDY

Brazil has a huge electorate spread across an enormous territory.

Yet shortly after voting ended on 4 October, Brazilians could watch their national result emerge electronically.

By 12:11 a.m., 99.99 per cent of the voting machines had been counted.

The numbers told the story:

Flávio Bolsonaro — 56,104,268 votes — 47.03%.

Lula da Silva — 53,876,617 votes — 45.16%.

No candidate had the required majority.

Therefore:

RUNOFF — 25 OCTOBER 2026.

That clarity is the point.

Nigeria does not need to copy Brazil blindly.

Nigeria needs to learn from systems that make electoral evidence available rapidly, publicly and in forms that outsiders can independently check.

Because the most important election result is not merely the figure announced by an official.

It is a result for which the underlying evidence can withstand public scrutiny.

BEFORE 2027, NIGERIANS SHOULD DEMAND ONE SIMPLE PRINCIPLE:

LET EVERY POLLING UNIT SPEAK FOR ITSELF.

Publish the result.

Transmit the result.

Preserve the original.

Publish every stage of collation.

Create an immutable audit trail.

Let political parties check it.

Let journalists check it.

Let universities check it.

Let civil society check it.

Let Nigerians add the votes themselves.

Then the Returning Officer can perform the formal constitutional declaration.

Democracy becomes stronger when citizens do not have to choose between trusting a politician and trusting an electoral official.

They should be able to check the evidence themselves.

That is the real lesson Nigeria should take from Brazil.

And with the 2027 general election approaching, the time to build that system is not on election morning.

THE TIME IS NOW.

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